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ABSTRACT

The usefulness of a theory of social movement within organizations is tested within the California State University and Colleges. The drive for implementation of collective bargaining in the system is viewed as a form of intraorganizational insurgency, a collective action to improve the position of a discontented lower-level group, in conflict with higher-level decision-makers, by shifting organizational conditions in its favor. A causal model is developed in which faculty commitment to collective bargaining is seen as a function of trust in incumbent authorities, legitimization of faculty organizations, trust in the faculty senate, personal efficacy, felt deprivation, expectations of collective bargaining's impact, and general political orientation. Two components of faculty commitment are considered: expressed support and militancy (support for strikes and other militant activities). The analysis reinforces the view that social movement theory provides a useful approach to analyzing organizational phenomena, and further development of the approach in the university setting is felt to be warranted. Consideration of interaction effects of these and other possible variables is seen as worthwhile, and testing in other universities is suggested. Success and failure of insurgency in different institutions is also recommended. (MSE)

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INTRAORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY:

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Conceptual Framework

Zald and Berger (1978) have demonstrated the ubiquitous presence of social movement type phenomena within organizations, stressed the infrequency of efforts to deal systematically with these phenomena as a general problem, pointed to a few efforts to apply social movement theory to analysis of organizational phenomena, and proposed a broad framework for the analysis of social movements in organizations.

The usefulness of a social movement approach to explaining organizational phenomena can be tested at both macro and micro levels.[1] The present paper uses such an approach at the micro level. The context is the California State University and Colleges (CSUC).[2] We view a drive for the implementation of collective bargaining in a university as a form of intraorganizational insurgency: a collective action to improve the position of a discontented lower-level group, in conflict with higher-level decision makers, by shifting organizational conditions in its favor. Our objective is to specify a causal model that incorporates social-psychological variables hypothesized to be associated with: (1) faculty support for collective bargaining; and (2) faculty propensity to act in that support through engaging in militant behavior.

A social movement perspective assumes the existence of discontent within an organization which gives rise to the expression of a preference for change within a group, large or small, located within the vertically or horizontally differentiated social structure of the organization. This approach draws much from Gamson's (1968, 1975) work in political sociology. We view a drive for collective bargaining as an attack upon both the "incumbent authorities" (trustees and administrators) and the "political institutions" (governance system) of a university.[3] Gamson (1968) uses the latter term to include "both structural arrangements and the formal and informal rules of operation" (p. 50). Collective bargaining incorporates new structural arrangements and rules; while it need not imply new trustees and administrators, it tends to reduce faculty dependency through power equalization. We also derive from Gamson's (1968) work the argument that distrust in incumbent authorities and political institutions is a crucial determinant of the extent to which faculty members can be mobilized in support of collective bargaining.

From this theoretical perspective, distrust in incumbent authorities and existing political institutions is viewed as a function of discontent and perceived

personal inefficacy to influence decisions in one's favor. These conditions provide the bases for mobilization of potential movement members by social movement organizations. Perceived personal inefficacy alone may be an insufficient basis for mobilization since the contented may be willing to leave existing arrangements undisturbed even in the absence of personal influence. One would also expect support for a social movement organization to be associated with perceptions that the organization, when successful, would effectively represent one's interests and/or would provide a channel for increased personal efficacy (Marsh, 1977; Schwartz, 1973). A complication exists with respect to political institutions in the university context. In many universities, including the CSUC, the political institutions include senates as a structural arrangement for faculty representation. One would expect that the extent to which a faculty member legitimizes the influence of senates would have an impact on propensity to be mobilized in support of collective bargaining to the extent that the faculty member associates a faculty organization with support or lack of support for the senate mechanism. We incorporate this factor in our analysis.

We incorporate in our analysis an assessment of the impact of the presence of rival social movement organizations. Fendrich (1977) has provided a descriptive case study of an insurgent faculty union in the Florida state university system. While his case is one in which the insurgent union acted in a "power vacuum," we examine here a situation in which moderate and militant faculty organizations are in conflict. These provide alternative channels for transforming the discontent of potential movement partisans into support for social movement outcomes. We may assess the impact of the presence of such alternatives on the intensity of mobilization, and in the next section we argue that this impact should be positive. In addition, we investigate: (1) the extent to which the roots of support for militant and moderate movement organizations are different, and therefore the extent to which they are independent channels for mobilization; and (2) whether the support for the militant organization leads to faculty change orientations (degree of support for collective bargaining, and militancy propensity) different from those associated with support for the moderate organization.

Personal general political orientation (along a left-right scale) is viewed as a potentially important factor in view of the frequent identification of AFT affiliates as "left" oriented organizations. One would expect left-oriented faculty members to be more susceptible to mobilization by such affiliates. Further,

the frequently noted tendency for political extremists to distrust incumbent authorities and political institutions at the societal level (Marsh, 1977; Schwartz, 1973) may carry over into the organizational context.

We now turn to a discussion of conditions and developments in the CSUC in terms of the preceding conceptual framework. These have been analyzed elsewhere (Gerth, Haehn, and Associates, 1971; Walker, 1974), and detailed evidence with respect to several of the following points is to be found in those sources.

The organizational context: the CSUC

Following World War II, the state colleges in California experienced rapid growth, shifts in mission, broad-ranging functional changes, and associated diversification of programs and personnel and structural differentiation--changes often asserted to be associated with internal strains and faculty discontent (Garbarino, 1975; Kemmerer and Baldridge, 1974). Rapid growth, large size, and associated resource allocation issues led to the establishment in 1961 of a central administration, headed by a Chancellor under a Board of Trustees, with overall system management responsibilities. The CSUC system is now very large: 19 main campuses, about 11,000 full-time faculty members, and almost 300,000 students.

Organizational structure is very complex, an elongated hierarchy runs from Board to faculty member, and policies and procedures are highly elaborate. Substantial faculty participation exists, including significant elements of collegialism at the departmental level, elaborate campus committee structures, campus senates, a systemwide senate, and "meet and confer" rights exercised by faculty organizations. Faculty participation structures and processes were established in the mid-1960s (earlier on some campuses), yet there have been continuing conflict at the systemwide level and on many campuses over the appropriate distribution of authority. In addition, for more than a decade, conflict has occurred over a succession of specific issues in areas of educational policy, faculty welfare, personnel procedures, and grievance procedures. Some of these issues have persisted unresolved for many years.

Considerable faculty dissatisfaction with respect to both particular issues and the distribution of authority was revealed through selective polls conducted in 1966 and 1967 (Walker, 1974). A systematic survey conducted in 1969 (Haehn, 1970) and data from our own 1976 survey show that dissatisfaction has persisted.

To the sources of dissatisfaction has been added in recent years the uncertainties and insecurities that derive from steady state conditions and the budgetary parsimony characteristic of the 1970s. We have evidence, then, of discontent, "generalized dissatisfaction"--where "potential partisans" view both incumbent authorities and institutions as "biased against them" (Gamson, 1968)--and expressions of preferences for change within the faculty.

Discontent provided opportunities for faculty organizations to engage in activity characteristic of social movement organizations. The five faculty organizations pre-dated the drive for collective bargaining.[4] Each had performed faculty representation functions of varying levels of intensity for a variable number of years (the AFT local being the most recently formed organization). The drive for collective bargaining was initiated by the AFT in 1965. This AFT initiative unleashed a succession of more intensive challenges to existing authorities as well as increasingly intensive conflict among faculty organizations. The non-AFT faculty organizations and the systemwide senate quickly became involved in the collective bargaining issue. As occurred elsewhere, the non-AFT organizations first opposed, then endorsed, then actively pursued collective bargaining rights; so did the senate.[5]

For several years after 1965, the AFT local and its successor organization, UPC, successfully maintained its initiative with skillful organizing efforts, seizing upon a succession of issues to build support among the faculty, militant activity, and membership growth--putting its rivals on the defensive, appearing to react to UPC initiatives. Yet, unlike the Florida case (Fendrich, 1977), where only the AFT affiliate was a significant force, other faculty organizations in the CSUC--with their long history, substantial membership base, and powerful parent organizations--were in a position to act on their own initiative as a powerful force. In 1973 AAUP, CCUFA, and CSEA formed a coalition, the Congress of Faculty Associations (CFA) with the primary purpose of securing collective bargaining rights with CFA as the bargaining agent. For a number of years, then, the CSUC has had two social movement organizations, each with strong grassroots support and skilled leadership cadres, acting aggressively to mobilize the faculty and deal with faculty problems, and promoting the drive for collective bargaining.

The existence of active rival social movement organizations influences the dynamics of mobilization and social movement outcomes. The intensity of mobilization is enhanced. Competition for bargaining rights increases the saliency of the

bargaining issue. Given heterogeneity of ideological positions and preferences with respect to specific movement outcomes (bargaining priorities), a larger number of faculty members are able, and are encouraged, to assume active roles in the struggle for bargaining rights within a faculty organization which they perceive as representing their own interests. A larger number of movement activists become engaged in mobilizing the faculty. Internal activists can draw upon a greater range of external resources (money, staff, political influence) through their various parent organizations. Such resources are more likely to be made available where parent organizations perceive that their internal affiliates have a high probability of success. Opportunities for propagating pro-bargaining positions are increased. Each of the rival organizations--in behavior typical of social movement organizations (Gamson, 1968)--engages in efforts to build its image as a powerful organization. Competition leads to a broader range of challenges to managerial efforts to assert social control, thus increasing the visibility of managerial "errors." When challenges fail, such failures are ascribed to the machinations of administrators and gubernatorial neglect, thus providing occasions for critiques of the existing governance system and propagation of the necessity for collective bargaining. Coming from various sources--in the CSUC from systemwide and campus senates as well as from CFA and UPC--these challenges and critiques undermine the positions of administrative authorities among the faculty and their confidence in the existing governance system.

Saliency, propagation, and the availability of alternative allegiances increases the chances of mobilizing the apathetic, the apolitical, and the uncommitted. These developments, in turn, generate a climate within which organizational members--including incumbent administrator authorities--come to believe that collective bargaining is inevitable and that the movement will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to stop. Administrator opposition is weakened, as are organized counter-insurgency efforts among the faculty. Increased faculty commitment to collective bargaining results.

The presence of an active powerful rival creates problems for a movement organization. Obviously, building solidarity around one organization is severely inhibited. The organizing activity of one is sharply restricted by the membership base of the other (membership distribution has been quite stable in the CSUC for several years). It also becomes more difficult for one organization to build a broad coalition among heterogeneous groups within the general faculty. For a

given organization, the existence of the rival, with its pre-emption of a basic position, complicates mobilization strategy. For UPC--as in the case of the Florida AFT affiliate (Fendrich, 1977), a movement "from the left"--the problem has been to maintain a militant posture while appealing to the "moderates" within the general faculty. UPC has experienced continuing internal conflicts over the appropriate balance between ideology and pragmatics. For CFA--viewed by faculty and administrators alike, as our own data show, as the "more moderate" organization--the dilemma has been to preserve an image of "responsibility" while adopting an increasingly activist posture. These strategic difficulties help to preserve basic distinctions between the rival movement organizations and differential allegiances to these alternatives among the faculty. Our basic argument here is that the presence of rival movement organizations will strengthen the commitment to social movement outcomes (here, collective bargaining), and provide two routes to that commitment.

Empirical analysis

Based on the theoretical framework presented above, we have developed a causal model in which faculty commitment to collective bargaining is seen as a function of trust in incumbent authorities, legitimization of faculty organizations, trust in the faculty senate, personal efficacy, felt deprivation (job satisfaction), expectations concerning the impact of collective bargaining, and general political orientation. We consider two components of commitment to collective bargaining: expressed support for collective bargaining and militancy (degree to which the individual legitimizes strikes and other militant activities by university faculty). Our model also specifies causal relationships among the set of causal antecedents of commitment to collective bargaining. We consider each of the endogenous variables of our model in turn and then discuss the adequacy of the model as a whole, as well as avenues for further exploration.

A description of the variables used in this analysis is given in Appendix A. The simple correlation matrix is provided in Table 4. Due to the complexity of the model, we present the path coefficients in Tables 1, 2, and 3, rather than representing the model diagrammatically.

a) Trust in Incumbent Authorities: This first endogenous variable in our model is hypothesized to be a function of three of the exogenous determinants of commitment to collective bargaining. Trust in incumbent authorities is seen to be:

1. an increasing function of overall job satisfaction;
2. an increasing function of perceived personal efficacy;
3. an increasing function of political conservatism.

Hypothesis 1 is based on the argument that individuals will legitimize the authority of organizational superordinates to the extent that organizational rewards meet expectations. Overall job satisfaction is therefore the reciprocal of felt deprivation. The extent to which individuals feel a sense of control over behavior contingent outcomes will affect their sense of trust in administrators. The estimated path coefficients are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Determinants of Trust in Incumbent Authorities
(N=900)

Independent variable	Beta
Overall job satisfaction	.10[a]
Perceived personal efficacy	.20[a]
Political conservatism	.22[a]
R^2 = .15	

[a]Significant at .01 level.

As indicated, the hypotheses are confirmed. Although political conservatism is the strongest determinant of trust, personal efficacy is also quite important. While there is a fairly strong correlation between efficacy and job satisfaction (r = .54), efficacy does have an impact on trust in administrators which is independent of overall job satisfaction.

b) Legitimization of Faculty Organizations: The next two endogenous variables in our model are legitimization of the organizational influences of the CFA (the more moderate organization) and the UPC (the more militant organization). We view trust in incumbent authority to be a causal antecedent of both of these variables.

The extent to which individuals perceive of themselves as having control over behavior contingent outcomes in the organization will relate negatively to the intensity of mobilization. Legitimization of faculty organizations will be an increasing function of the expectation that such organizations will remedy system deficiencies. We have included two expectations measures. The first is the expectation that the faculty organization will increase faculty power relative to

Table 2. Determinants of Faculty Organization Legitimacy
(N=900)

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable: CFA Legitimacy (Beta)	Dependent Variable: UPC Legitimacy (Beta)
Trust in incumbent authorities	-.06[b]	-.09[b]
Perceived personal efficacy	-.11[a]	-.10[a]
Overall job satisfaction	-.07[b]	-.06[b]
Expected impact of organization on:		
Improving efficacy	.17[a]	.31[a]
Increasing faculty power	.11[a]	.08[b]
Political conservatism	.03	-.17[a]
Senate legitimacy	.25[a]	.14[a]
	R^2 = .19	R^2 = .38

[a]Significant at .01 level.

[b]Significant at .05 level.

the administration. This variable is strongly correlated with a number of other perceptions of the expected impact of collective bargaining and it is included as an indicator of the extent to which faculty see the organization as improving employment conditions in the CSUC. The second item is the expectation that the organization will increase personal efficacy. We posit that overall job satisfaction will be negatively related to legitimization of the faculty organizations. Our model therefore reflects the rational choice paradigm in that we include measures of outcome saliency (job satisfaction and perceived personal efficacy) and outcome likelihood (expectation). Legitimacy of faculty organizations is posited to be a positive function of senate legitimacy and a negative function of political conservatism. Path coefficients are presented in Table 3.

The coefficients are statistically significant and of the hypothesized sign in all except one of the cases. While political conservatism has a relatively strong and negative effect on legitimization of the UPC, it is statistically insignificant with respect to CFA legitimacy. This is not unreasonable since the CFA advocates a more moderate approach to bargaining. The sign of the coefficient is positive, suggesting there may be a tendency on the part of politically

conservative faculty to support the CFA as a hedge against UPC militancy. This observation is further supported by the fact that politically conservative faculty are prone to oppose collective bargaining in principle (see Table 3 and discussion below).

Senate legitimacy is more strongly related to CFA legitimacy ($p = .25$) than UPC legitimacy ($p = .14$). This, again, derives from moderate orientation of the CFA. This suggests that the goals and objectives of the CFA may be seen as more congruent with those of the senate. Faculty who see the need for increased senate influence in CSUC decision making may see both the UPC and CFA as instruments for achieving that increased influence and/or as substitutes for senate influence. The relative magnitudes of the coefficients suggests greater perceived compatibility between CFA and senate influence than between UPC and senate influence. Perceived personal efficacy exerts a stronger influence on legitimacy than overall job satisfaction, and the effect of the expectation that a faculty organization will increase efficacy is stronger than the effect of the expectation that an organization will increase system rewards. This would tend to support our argument that mobilization of faculty is strongly related to perceptions of inefficacy and the desire to enhance efficacy.

In terms of differences in the roots of support for militant versus moderate faculty organizations, we find the major differences to be with respect to political conservatism and senate legitimacy (as discussed above). In addition, we find that the more militant organization is evaluated more strongly in terms of its expected influence on personal efficacy ($p = .31$) than the more moderate organization ($p = .17$).

With respect to the overall adequacy of the model in explaining CFA versus UPC legitimacy, the coefficient of determination is much greater for UPC legitimacy ($R^2 = .38$) than for CFA legitimacy ($R^2 = .19$). This would suggest a need for further inquiry into the causal antecedents of the legitimization of moderate faculty organizations. We have some evidence to suggest that there is greater randomness with respect to CFA legitimacy. We found a much higher frequency of "don't know" responses to questions concerning perceptions of the CFA than for the UPC, suggesting faculty have greater difficulty in conceptualizing the factor underlying legitimization of the CFA. It may be worthwhile to consider support for the CFA as more normatively defined or habitual than rationalistic.

The model explained only part of the covariance of UPC and CFA legitimacy. The observed correlation between the two variables is .42, while the predicted

correlation is .30. There is, therefore, a moderate positive correlation between the residual terms, indicating some common unmeasured antecedents. This unexplained covariance may in part be due to the fact both variables are indicators of a generalized legitimization of unionism.

c) Support for Movement Outcomes: As noted above, we consider two measures of support for movement outcomes--support for bargaining and militancy propensity. While expectedly intercorrelated ($r = .62$), these two variables are in part conceptually distinct. That is, support for bargaining need not necessarily imply a propensity to engage in militant activities. We have considered militancy and support for bargaining as functions of all of the endogenous and exogenous variables discussed above.

Trust in incumbent authorities should be negatively related to support for movement outcomes, since trust will affect the extent to which these outcomes are seen as necessary. While both militancy and support for bargaining are negatively and significantly related to trust, the magnitude of the path coefficients relative to other variables is smaller than might be expected (Table 3). The relative strength of the CFA and UPC legitimacy items suggest that these are important intervening variables, as implied by the model.

Table 3. Determinants of Faculty Commitment to Collective Bargaining (N=900)

	Dependent Variable	
Independent Variable	Support for Bargaining (BETA)	Militancy (BETA)
Trust in incumbent authorities	-.08[a]	-.05[a]
Perceived personal efficacy	-.09[a]	-.12[a]
Overall job satisfaction	-.02	.00
Expectation that CFA will:		
Improve efficacy	.07[b]	-.07[b]
Increase faculty power	.03	.00
Expectation that UPC will:		
Improve efficacy	.15[a]	.14[a]
Increase faculty power	.11[a]	.09[a]
CFA legitimacy	.15[a]	.00
UPC legitimacy	.18[a]	.27[a]
Political conservatism	-.18[a]	-.24[a]
Senate legitimacy	.08[a]	.10[a]
	$R^2 = .47$	$R^2 = .43$

[a] [illegible] [b] [illegible]

Perceived personal efficacy has a strong, negative simple correlation with both dependent variables (Table 4), but has relatively moderate direct effects in both cases. The path coefficients for both perceived efficacy and trust do not differ appreciably between militancy and support for bargaining.

Overall job satisfaction has no significant direct effect in either case, indicating that its simple correlation results from indirect effects (i.e., its effects through trust in administration and faculty organization legitimization).

In line with the rational choice model as discussed above, the expected impact of bargaining under each of the faculty organizations should affect support for movement outcomes. In the case of expectations concerning the impact of the CFA, we find the expectation that efficacy will be enhanced increases ($p = .07$) support for bargaining and decreases militancy ($p = -.07$). This is reasonable, since if one expects increased influence, the need to be militant would presumably decrease. However, this does not appear to be the case with the expected impact of the UPC on efficacy or on faculty power. Both are significantly and positively associated with militancy. This suggests that faculty view the achievement of increased efficacy and power under the UPC as implying the use of militant tactics. The expectation that the CFA will improve faculty power is unrelated to either militancy or support for bargaining. Both UPC expectation items are positively and significantly related to support for bargaining as expected.

As noted in the previous section, the UPC expectation items are of greater explanatory power in the cases of both dependent variables than are the CFA items. Again we argue that this flows from what appears to be a greater sense of uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the nature of CFA orientation toward collective bargaining. Hence a faculty member may not place a great deal of confidence in the accuracy of his/her perception of the CFA.

The faculty organization legitimacy items are both positively and significantly related to support for bargaining. However, militancy is strongly and positively affected by UPC legitimacy but not by CFA legitimacy. This appears to be the clearest distinction in terms of differences in the causal antecedents of militancy and support for bargaining. This difference would be expected based on the distinction in ideological orientation between the two organizations. Political conservatism is negatively and significantly related to both dependent variables. Expectedly, it is somewhat stronger in the case of militancy. Senate legitimacy is positively and significantly related to both dependent variables. The fact that this is the case for militancy is surprising.

The overall explanatory power of the model is relatively strong for both variables (R^2 = .48 for support for bargaining; R^2 = .43 for militancy). The predicted correlation between militancy and support for bargaining is .34, while the observed correlation is .64. This large unexplained covariance is expected due to the fact that both are indicators of a more general dimension: support for movement outcomes. In addition, we would expect the unmeasured causal antecedents of both dependent variables to be similar.

The analysis developed here may be taken to reinforce the view that social movement theory provides a useful approach to analyzing organizational phenomena. Further development of this approach in the university context would appear to be warranted. Such further development should include alternative specifications of social movement-based models, including variables not incorporated here as well as testing of alternative hypotheses with respect to relationships among variables. Consideration of interaction effects would be especially worthwhile. Such models should be tested in different university contexts, as well as through comparative analysis of success and failure of organizational insurgency across differing environmental, organizational, and contextual university settings (Lawler and Walker, 1978). Such comparative analysis also needs to be conducted across a variety of types of organizations.

TABLE 4

CORRELATION MATRIX

	1	2	3	4	5
2	.53700				
3	.30750	-.26093			
4	.32049	.26703	-.30846		
5	-.33561	-.21135	-.14484	-.06412	
6	-.27148	-.20034	-.08904	-.13468	.31927
7	-.38563	-.32076	-.39875	-.29727	.26389
8	-.17800	-.17484	-.27332	-.16748	.08298
9	-.33070	-.28076	-.35438	-.25550	.11250
10	.01546	.05033	.00654	-.03702	.05107
11	-.20011	-.11669	-.12517	-.08679	.06945
12	-.41429	-.32183	-.43803	-.31911	.27944
13	-.40140	-.30266	-.48998	-.29699	.27248

KEY:
1) Personal Efficacy
2) Overall Job Satisfaction
3) Political Conservatism
4) Trust in Incumbent Authorities
5) Senate Legitimacy
6) CFA Legitimacy
7) UPC Legitimacy
8) Expected Impact of UPC on Faculty P
9) " " " " " Efficacy
10) " " " " " Faculty P
11) " " " " " Efficacy
12) Support for Bargaining
13) Militancy

	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
7	.42751						
8	.09072	.30239					
9	.13219	.49233	.38050				
10	.16854	.03638	.44345	.00571			
11	.25135	.18635	.13672	.50433	.28920		
12	.37451	-.53893	-.35548	.47797	-.14058	-.30655	
13	.21357	-.53998	.31575	-.42360	.03308	.13084	.62661

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS

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1) Personal Efficacy: Degree of satisfaction with personal influence over decisions affecting professional life made beyond academic department

2) Overall Job Satisfaction: Expressed degree of satisfaction with job in general

3) Political Conservatism: Political self-characterization, ranging from "left" to "very conservative"

4) Trust in Incumbent Authorities: $T=\sum_{I}(A_i-B_i)$; where A_i is perceived ideal level of influence for administrative entity "i" (i.e., campus presidents, chancellor's office, academic deans, campus administrators) and B_i is perceived actual influence of entity "i". (alpha=.75).

5) Senate Legitimacy: Difference between perceived ideal level of influence for faculty senate and perceived existing level of influence

6) CFA and UPC Legitimacy: Difference between perceived ideal level of influence for CFA (UPC) and perceived actual influence for CFA (UPC)

7) Expectation Measures: Degree to which UPC (CFA) is expected to increase personal efficacy and faculty influence (power) under collective bargaining

8) Support for bargaining: Expressed degree of support for establishment of collective bargaining in the CSUC

9) Militancy: Expressed sense of opposition to use of strikes and other "militant" tactics by university faculty

Notes

[1]This paper is based upon research conducted within the Faculty Unionism Project at the Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley. The project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation, is directed by Joseph W. Garbarino.

[2]For a related macro-level analysis, see Lawler and Walker (1978). Data for the present study are derived from mailed questionnaires administered in 1976 to a random sample of full-time CSUC faculty members.

[3]Nixon (1975) has proposed a causal model for explaining faculty trust in sources of university authority (trustees and administration) and desire to challenge the authority structure of the university. Using data from a survey of faculty members at the University of Vermont, Nixon presents evidence of the significance of faculty dissatisfaction (with reward policies) as a determinant of trust in university administrators and trustees. While our methodology is similar to Nixon's, we consider mobilization processes, and our set of variables and specified relationships differ.

[4]Currently, the five faculty organizations are: (1) the CSUC State Council of the California Conference of the AAUP; (2) the Association of California State University Professors, an independent group; (3) the California College and University Faculty Association, affiliated with the California Teachers Association, the state affiliate of the National Education Association; (4) the CSUC Academic Council of the California State Employees Association; and (5) the United Professors of California, affiliated with the California Federal of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO. Throughout we refer to the CSUC faculty organizations as AAUP, ACSUP, CCUFA, CSEA, and UPC, and use the phrase "parent organization" when referring to organizations with which they are affiliated.

[5]The ACSUP, now the smallest of the faculty organizations, continues to oppose collective bargaining.

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